Employment Law Blog

Misleading communications “pose a serious threat to the fairness of the litigation process, the adequacy of representation, and the administration of justice generally.” Cheverez, supra, at *4-6; Howard Gunty, supra, 88 Cal.App4th at 582. The “responsibility to monitor communications is heightened where potential class members are unrepresented by their own counsel.” Cheverez at *6. Courts have found that this responsibility is also heightened when an employer engages in unsupervised communications with its workers regarding a settlement offer. See Marino v. CACafe, Inc. (N.D.Cal. April 28, 2017) 2017 WL 1540717 (“in the context of class action litigation, whether pre- or post-certification, unsupervised communications between an employer and its workers present an acute risk of coercion and abuse.”)

There are many public policy considerations that favor the use of class actions in the employment context in California.  First, individual awards in employment cases tend to be modest so the availability of a class action claim plays an important function by permitting employees a relatively inexpensive way to resolve their disputes. Additionally, class actions allow many employees, who may not otherwise file an individual suit due to fear of retaliation, to safely have their day in court as a member of the class. Class actions also serve to inform and protect employees who, for one reason or another, may not otherwise become aware that their rights are even being violated.

Meal and rest break claims are specifically suited to class treatment. See Brinker Rest. Corp., 53 Cal.4th at 1033 (certifying a California class with meal and rest break claims).

As the California Supreme Court has noted, an employer meets the requirements of the applicable Wage Order’s meal period requirement if the employee (1) has at least 30 minutes uninterrupted, (2) is free to leave the premises, and (3) is relieved of all duty for the entire period. Id. at 1036.

However, in the health care industry, as discussed in a Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”) Opinion Letter approved by the Brinker Court, an employer may require an employee to remain on its premises, “so long as the worker is relieved of all duties during the meal period.” Dept. Industrial Relations, DLSE Opinion Letter No. 1996.07.12 (July 12, 1996) p. 1 (“1996 Opinion Letter”). In that Opinion Letter, the DLSE discussed whether an employee that is required to carry a pager during a purported meal period must be compensated. The DLSE determined that: “[s]o long as the employee who is simply required to wear the pager is not called upon during the meal period to respond, there is no requirement that the meal period be paid for. On the other hand, if the employee responds, as required to a pager call during the meal period, the whole of the meal period must be compensated.”

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), individuals may bring suit “on behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Neither the statute itself nor the Ninth Circuit have defined the term “similarly situated,” Luque v. AT&T Corp., 2010 WL 4807088 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2010) at *3, citing Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co., 669 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1127 (N.D.Cal. 2009). Courts in the Ninth Circuit take a two-step approach to determine whether plaintiffs are “similarly situated.” Id.

The Court’s first step is to make an initial, conditional determination of whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated, “deciding whether a collective action should be certified for the purpose of sending notice to potential class members.” Luque, supra, at *3, quoting Lewis, supra, at 1127. The initial notice stage determination utilizes a lenient standard that typically results in certification. Wynn v. National Broad Co., Inc., 234 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1082 (C.D.Cal. 2002). While the initial inquiry is not a mere formality, plaintiffs seeking conditional certification need only provide “substantial allegations, supported by declarations or discovery.” Luque, supra, at *3, citing Kress v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 263 F.R.D. 623, 627 (E.D.Cal. 2009). Indeed, “Courts need not even consider evidence provided by defendants at this stage.” Luque, supra, at *3 (emphasis in original), quoting Kress, supra, at 628.

“The California Supreme Court has developed a multi-factor test for determining employment status.” Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp. (9th Cir. 2011) 667 F.3d 1318, 1324, quoting S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. of Indust. Rel. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 (“Borello”).  “[U]nder California law, once a plaintiff comes forward with evidence that he provided services for an employer, the employee has established a prima facie case that the relationship was one of employer/employee.” Narayan v. EGL, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 616 F.3d 895, 900, citing Robinson v. George, (1940) 16 Cal.2d 238, 243-244. “Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer, which may prove, if it can, that the presumed employee was an independent contractor.” Id. (citation omitted).
Under California law, primary test of an employment relationship is whether “the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired….” Borello, supra, at 350. While the right to control work details is the most important factor, there are also “’secondary’ indicia of the nature of a service arrangement.” Id. These secondary factors, principally derived from the Rest.2d Agency, include