Employment Law Blog

In cases where an employer failed to maintain accurate records of employees’ hours worked, evidence of the extent of employees’ working hours must be established primarily by testimonial evidence.  This is the established method of proof:
“[W]here the employer’s records are inaccurate or inadequate and the employee cannot offer convincing substitutes a . . . difficult problem arises.  The solution, however, is not to penalize the employee by denying him any recovery on the ground that he is unable to prove the precise extent of uncompensated work.  Such a result would place a premium on an employer’s failure to keep proper records in conformity with his statutory duty; it would allow the employer to keep the benefits of an employee’s labors without paying due compensation.  . . .  In such a situation we hold that an employee has carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.  The burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee’s evidence.”
Hernandez v. Mendoza (1988), 199 Cal.App.3d 721, 727 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. (1946) 328 U.S. 680, 687–688).

Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512 and the applicable wage orders require Defendant to authorize and permit meal and rest periods to its employees. California law prohibits employers from employing an employee for more than five hours without a meal period of at least 30 minutes. “[A]n employer’s obligation is to provide an off duty […]

It is well established that an employee’s on-call or standby time may require compensation. “Of course, an employer, if he chooses, may hire a man to do nothing, or to do nothing but wait for something to happen. Refraining from other activity often is a factor of instant readiness to serve, and idleness plays a part in all employments in a stand-by capacity. Readiness to serve may be hired, quite as much as service itself.” (Armour & Co. v. Wantock (1944) 323 U.S. 126, 133; see Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944) 323 U.S. 134, 137 (“Facts may show that the employee was engaged to wait, or they may show that he waited to be engaged.”); Madera Police Officers Assn. v. City of Madera (1984) 36 Cal.3d 403, 406 (concluding officers’ on-call mealtime was compensable hours worked).)

California law defines a “personal attendant” as “any person employed by a private householder . . . in the health care industry to work in a private household, to supervise, feed, or dress a child, or a person who by reason of advanced age, physical disability, or mental deficiency needs supervision. The status of personal attendant shall apply when no significant amount of work other than the foregoing is required. For purposes of this subdivision, “no significant amount of work” means work other than the foregoing did not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked.” (Labor Code § 1451(d).)

Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512 and the applicable wage orders require Defendants to authorize and permit meal and rest periods to their employees. California law prohibits employers from employing an employee for more than five hours without a meal period of at least 30 minutes, and from employing an employee more than ten hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes. “[A]n employer’s obligation is to provide an off duty meal period: an uninterrupted 30–minute period during which the employee is relieved of all duty.” Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1035 (2012). “An employer must relieve the employee of all duty for the designated period.” Id. at 1034. An employer cannot “impede or discourage [employees] from [taking breaks].” Id. at 1040. Section 226.7 and applicable wage orders also require employers to authorize and permit employees to take 10-minute rest periods for each four hours or major fraction thereof of work, and to pay employees their full wages during their rest periods. “[A]s a general matter,” one rest break should fall on either side of the meal break.” Id. at 1032. Unless the employee is relieved of all duty during the 30-minute meal period and 10-minute rest period, the employee is considered “on duty” and the meal or rest period is counted as time worked under the applicable wage orders. When an employer fails to provide a rest or meal period in accordance with the applicable wage orders, the employer must pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of pay for each workday that a required rest period is not provided, and one additional hour of pay for each work day that a compliant meal period is not provided. Labor Code § 226.7.

California state laws require that all non-exempt employees be compensated at time-and-a-half for all hours worked over 8 hours per day and 40 hours in a week. See California Labor Code section 510(a) and Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order, Order No. 7-2001 section 3(A). The law further requires employers to maintain accurate time records for all of the hours worked by its employees, provide accurate itemized wage statements, authorize, permit and provide meal and rest periods, and pay all wages earned to an employee immediately upon their termination.

California Labor Code section 226.7 prohibits employers from requiring its employees to work during any rest period mandated by the Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Orders. “[I]n light of the remedial nature of the legislative enactments authorizing the regulation of wages, hours and working conditions for the protection and benefit of employees, the statutory provisions are to be liberally construed with an eye to promoting such protection.” Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 690, 702. “[T]he IWC’s wage orders are entitled to ‘extraordinary deference, both in upholding their validity and in enforcing their specific terms.’” Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1027 (quoting Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 61). Rest break requirements “have long been viewed as part of the remedial worker protection framework.” Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1105.

Employees must be relieved of all duty during their meal and rest breaks. Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1035–1036; Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 220, 236. During breaks, an employee “must be free to attend to any personal business he or she may choose.” Brinker, 53 Cal.4th at 1036. An employee is working and “on duty” when he is “subject to the control of an employer,” “including all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” Wage Order No. 9 § 2(H). Time spent by an employee waiting on standby for the benefit of the employer is considered to be on duty. Madera Police Officers Assn. v. City of Madera (1984) 36 Cal.3d 403.

Wrongful termination from employment is tortious when the termination occurs in violation of a fundamental public policy. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1082, 1090. A policy is “fundamental” when it is “carefully tethered” to a policy “delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions” (id. at p. 1095), involves a duty affecting the public at large, rather than one owed to or imposed solely upon the parties to a dispute (id. at 1090), and is “well established” and “sufficiently clear” to the employer at the time of the discharge. Id. Wrongful termination cases typically arise when an employer retaliates against an employee for refusing to violate a statute, performing a statutory obligation, exercising a statutory right, or reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public importance. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1256 (1994). However, as noted in Soules v. Cadam, Inc. 2 Cal.App.4th 360, 201 (1991), an action for tortious discharge is not strictly limited to these situations but will lie “wherever the basis of the discharge contravenes a fundamental public policy.”