Employment Law Blog

The plaintiff’s prima facie burden in a retaliation case is to (1) show he or she engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the employer’s action. (McRae v. Dept. of Corr. & Rehab. (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 377, 386). Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation, the defendant must provide a legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show this explanation is merely a pretext for the retaliation. (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 68–9.)
An employer is prohibited from retaliating against a complainant who made “a bona fide oral or written complaint to his employer of unsafe working conditions, or work practices, in his employment or place of employment.” (Labor Code § 6310(b).) In order to be protected against discharge, a complainant need only make a good faith complaint about working conditions that he believes to be unsafe. (Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 109; Hentzel v. Singer Co. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 290, 299.)

An employee is protected against discharge or discrimination for complaining in good faith about working conditions or practices which he reasonably believes to be unsafe, whether or not an actual law was being violated. Labor Code § 6310; Hentzel v. Singer Co. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 290, 299–300; Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 87; Freund v. Nycomed Amersham (9th Cir. 2003) 347 F.3d 752, 759; Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 109. Thus, it is immaterial if the practice was actually unsafe or whether there was an OSHA standard that was actually being violated. The employee need only have complained in good faith about the working conditions or practices.

To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complaint must state sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Chavez v. United States, 683 F. 3d 1102, 1108-1109 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, a defendant is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings if the complaint raises issues of fact which, if proved, would support recovery. General Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F. 2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) they engaged in a protected activity, (2) that they were thereafter subjected to adverse employment action by their employer, and (3) there was a causal link between the two.  Iwekaogwu v. City of Los Angeles, 75 Cal.App.4th 803, 814 (1999), quoting Flait v. North American Watch Corp., 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 476 (1992).

In order to be protected against discharge, a complainant need only make a good faith complaint about working conditions that they believes to be unsafe. Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 1009 (1998) [emphasis added].  An employer is prohibited from retaliating against a complainant who made “a bona fide oral or written complaint to [their] employer of unsafe working conditions, or work practices, in [their] employment or place of employment.” Labor Code § 6310(b) [emphasis added].

The test for whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee is whether the employer has the right to control the manner and means of the worker’s performance.  S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 349–351.  A number of different factors contribute to the extent of control that an employer exercises over its workers: (1) the right to discharge at will, without cause; (2) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (3) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (4) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (5) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; and (6) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the principal.  Id.

Wrongful termination from employment is tortious when the termination occurs in violation of a fundamental public policy. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1090. A policy is “fundamental” when it is “carefully tethered” to a policy “delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions” (id. at p. 1095), involves a duty affecting the public at large, rather than one owed to or imposed solely upon the parties to a dispute (id. at 1090), and is “well established” and “sufficiently clear” to the employer at the time of the discharge. Id. Wrongful termination cases typically arise when an employer retaliates against an employee for refusing to violate a statute, performing a statutory obligation, exercising a statutory right, or reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public importance. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1256 (1994). However, as noted in Soules v. Cadam, Inc. 2 Cal.App.4th 390, 401 (1991), an action for tortious discharge is not strictly limited to these situations but will lie “wherever the basis of the discharge contravenes a fundamental public policy.”

Wrongful termination from employment is tortious when the termination occurs in violation of a fundamental public policy. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1090. A policy is “fundamental” when it is “carefully tethered” to a policy “delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions” (id. at p. 1095), involves a duty affecting the public at large, rather than one owed to or imposed solely upon the parties to a dispute (id. at 1090), and is “well established” and “sufficiently clear” to the employer at the time of the discharge. Id. Wrongful termination cases typically arise when an employer retaliates against an employee for refusing to violate a statute, performing a statutory obligation, exercising a statutory right, or reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public importance. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1256 (1994). However, as noted in Soules v. Cadam, Inc. 2 Cal.App.4th 390, 401 (1991), an action for tortious discharge is not strictly limited to these situations but will lie “wherever the basis of the discharge contravenes a fundamental public policy.”

Wrongful termination from employment is tortious when the termination occurs in violation of a fundamental public policy. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1082, 1090. A policy is “fundamental” when it is “carefully tethered” to a policy “delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions” (id. at p. 1095), involves a duty affecting the public at large, rather than one owed to or imposed solely upon the parties to a dispute (id. at 1090), and is “well established” and “sufficiently clear” to the employer at the time of the discharge. Id. Wrongful termination cases typically arise when an employer retaliates against an employee for refusing to violate a statute, performing a statutory obligation, exercising a statutory right, or reporting an alleged violation of a statute of public importance. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1256 (1994). However, as noted in Soules v. Cadam, Inc. 2 Cal.App.4th 360, 201 (1991), an action for tortious discharge is not strictly limited to these situations but will lie “wherever the basis of the discharge contravenes a fundamental public policy.”